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BOOK REVIEW
THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY, 1810-1860: CONSIDERATIONS OF
HUMANITY AND INTEREST. Mark V Tshnet. Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press. 1981. Pp. 262. $20.00 (cloth), $9.50 (paper).
Americans are fascinated by the history of Black slavery.' Even if
the reisons for our interest in slavery are unclear, American books on
slavery and its legal aspects generally have been written so as to vindi-
cate the author's political or social ideology. A brief review of some of
the leading books reveals this tendency and also sets the stage for consid-
eration of Mark Tushnet's The American Law of Slavey. 2
The first major study of slavery in this century was Ulrich B. Phil-
lips's American Negro Slavery.3 Phillips was a southern apologist and ra-
cist. His book attempted to place slavery in the context of a benign
agrarian order, the "plantation regime," and to demonstrate that it was
the northern capitalists and their abolitionist allies who provoked the
Civil War. A less obvious theme of the book was the suggestion that
Blacks were tolerably well off under slavery.
Kenneth Stampp's The Peculiar Institution4 represented a liberal,
non-sectionalist reaction to Phillips. Stampp accepted Phillips's general
perspective on slavery as primarily a labor system. Stampp argued,
however, that slavery survived only by savagely crushing Black victims.
Stampp used legal materials, including statutory slave law and court
decisions, to support his argument.
Stampp's book, which still dominates scholarship on slavery, was
challenged in 1959 by Stanley Elkins in Slavery. 5 Elkins attempted to
refocus historical discussion from slavery as a labor system to slavery as
an institution to be considered anthropologically. Elkins contrasted
American slavery with the slave systems of Spanish and Portuguese
America. The latter systems interposed a powerful centralized institu-
tion, the Roman Catholic Church, between the slaves and their masters
for certain purposes. 6 Elkins also drew on studies of World War II con-
1 The annual production of new books on various aspects of slavery illustrates this fasci-
nation. The 1981 Christmas book edition of the New York Times Book Review Section de-
scribes, for example, several new books on Black American slavery, aspects which in each case
earlier books have discussed. N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1981, § 7 (Book Review), at 14, 58, 62.
2 M. TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY, 1810-1860: CONSIDERATIONS OF
HuMANITY AND INTEREST (1981).
3 U. PHILLIPS, AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY (1918).
4 K. STAMPp, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION (1956).
5 S. ELKINS, SLAVERY (1959).
6 Id. at 76-79.
BOOK REVIEW
centration camp inmates in an attempt to explain why slave resistance
was less strong than one might have expected it to be. He suggested that
the massive disorientation experienced by Blacks abducted from Africa
and Jews transported to Auschwitz made these two groups psychologi-
cally similar.
Eugene Genovese's Roll, Jordon, Roll 7 rejected Elkins's conclusions
but accepted much of his general approach. Rolljordon, Roll is a social
history of slavery constructed from the perspective of the slaves. Geno-
vese, a neo-marxist, posited that slavery as an economic institution was
an anachronistic, precapitalist phenomenon. It sustained itself in the
face of Black opposition by two devices. First, the law of slavery served
a hegemonic function: It served to establish and legitimize for all classes
and races a system that ultimately vested all power in a single class of
wealthy southern merchants and landowners. Second, the dissemina-
tion of Christianity among the slaves proved, to use Marx's phrase, an
opiate. Christianity taught the slaves not to resist; it soothed their frus-
trations with promises of freedom at the end of the line. A good deal of
literary and religious evidence from the slave culture reflects this dual
function of slave religion.8
Robert Cover'sJstice Accused 9 was the first major book in this area
to use legal materials almost exclusively. Cover studied the behavior of
anti-slavery judges in cases involving slaves during the years 1800-1860
and found a decisional law retreat into formalism and rigid positivism.
He attributed this retreat to the increasing level of dissonance in the
judges, caused by the conflict between institutional demands and their
personal opposition to slavery. Cover focused on four major judges, in-
cluding Justice Joseph Story and Judge Lemuel Shaw. While Cover's
book is more about judicial behavior than about slavery jurisprudence,
it is appropriate to commence consideration with Mark Tushnet's The
American Law of Slavery 1810-1860.
Tushnet studied legal materials relating to the development of
what he calls "American slave law" in the slave-holding states sixty
years before the Civil War. He did not limit the study to legal materials
out of a belief that the legal system operated independently of the soci-
ety. Like most commentators who find marxist insights useful, Tushnet
believes that any legal system, while perhaps having enough autonomy
to guarantee its successful functioning in a hegemonic way, in fact re-
flects the material social relations of the underlying social order. Marx-
ists vary, of course, as to the extent of autonomy given the basic
ideology; all that one can say is that Tushnet does not seem to ally him-
self with those, like Genovese, who make great concessions to autonomy.
7 E. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL (1974).
8 Id. at 161-93.
9 R. COVER, JUSnCE ACCUSED (1970).
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Tushnet's book is not a chronological survey of the development of
slave law. In fact, he eschews the conventional historical approach of
tracing slave law from colonial times until its destruction by the Eman-
cipation Proclamation and the thirteenth amendment in either a single
state or on a general level. The only exception to Tushnet's achrono-
logical approach is his description of the development of the common
law of slavery in North Carolina from 1800 to 1860.
Understanding the chronology of the development of slave law is a
precondition to understanding and evaluating Tushnet's book. Slavery
did not exist at English common law. 10 Thus, when settlers came to the
various colonies, they had no formal legal equipment to deal with slav-
ery. At the same time, for reasons Winthrop Jordan has developed,"
they accepted more or less the notion of having slaves, as opposed to
servants, of African ancestry. As early as the seventeenth century, some
colonies passed elaborate laws to regulate slaves and masters. 12 Other
colonies did not pass colonial codes.' 3 The northern colonies, which are
not discussed in Tushnet's book, apparently allowed slaves and masters
to pass through without explicit legal recognition or treatment until
about the time of the revolution, when virtually all of the northern
states abolished slavery by case law or statute.
After the passage of the Virginia Code in 1705,14 the southern colo-
nies enacted laws that defined in increasing detail the legal regime gov-
erning slavery. Slaves were denominated "chattel" property. Laws
denied slaves the right to hold property. In some cases, slaves were sub-
ject to the criminal jurisdiction of special slaveholders' "courts." Some
of these laws accorded minimal protections to slaves; for instance, the
murder of a slave was recognized as a homicide. Many laws also regu-
lated the property and other rights of free Blacks.
In The Peculiar Institution, Kenneth Stampp devoted a chapter to
slave cases, codes, and the interpretation of codes.' 5 Stampp suggested
that the codes were increasingly "humanized" in the course of the nine-
teenth century. He did not develop this argument, however, or marshal
evidence to support it. At other points, Stampp suggested that many
legal rules became harsher, at least on their face, as time passed.
10 This claim requires qualification. It is true that the common law recognized villein-
age, or the subjugated status of certain agricultural workers tied to land within the feudal
structure. See I F. POLLOCK & W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 412-32 (2d
ed. 1968). But villeinage was a status that flowed from one's tenure on a parcel of land, not
from one's race, and that provided a community framework in the manorial courts for the
protection of villeins' rights. These two characteristics distinguish villeinage from the racial
slavery that developed in various English Colonies from the beginning of the imperial period.
11 W. JORDAN, THE WHITE MAN's BURDEN (1974).
12 K. STAMPp, supra note 4, at 237-38.
13 M. TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 90-91.
14 See III W. HENNING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINL 447 (c. 49) (1812).
15 K. STAMPP, supra note 4, at 237-79.
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Taking a very different approach, Mark Tushnet argues that the
American law of slavery, in its developing and in its most developed
state, should be viewed from the perspective of bourgeois law. To use
scientific terminology, bourgeois law is the "control" in his experiment.
Bourgeois law, at its simplest, is the law governing the relationship be-
tween a capitalist employer and his workers. According to Tushnet, it is
also the entire common law and its methodology. Bourgeois law is con-
cerned initially with obtaining the labor of the worker; more fundamen-
tally, it creates and preserves a bourgeois social order.
Tushnet's principal argument is that slave law could never be as
circumscribed as bourgeois law. Because the relationship of master to
slave was all-embracing, slave law could not be fitted into the common
law, read "bourgeois law." Tushnet constructs a schema that graphi-
cally demonstrates his thesis:16
Bourgeois Law Slave Law
Interest Alone Humanity (sentiment) and Interest
Partial Total
Common Law Statutory Law
Market Relations Slave Relations
Contract Tort
Analogies Categories
This schema should not be viewed as a road map which explains in
a simple fashion how slavery law reached a particular point of develo-
ment. It is partially descriptive of intrinsic conditions:
Interest Alone Humanity (sentiment) and Interest
Partial Total
Market Relations Slave Relations
It is also partially descriptive of the structures and consequences for de-
velopment that flowed from these conditions:
Common Law Statutory Law
Contract Tort
Analogies Categories
Finally, like all marxist dialecticism, the intrinsic condition becomes the
final result:
Interest Alone Humanity (sentiment) ad. Interest
Tushnet argues that since bourgeois law focused exclusively on in-
terest and market relations, it could not be applied to the slave system.
Therefore, an elaborate system of statutory law was developed to recog-
nize and regularize the slave system. Tushnet believes that the law of
slavery would have swallowed up the entire southern legal system, had it
16 M. TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 216-18.
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not been destroyed in the Civil War. He sets out his theory on this mat-
ter in the book's conclusion:
The manumission cases suggest that Southern law was moving in the
same direction as Southern politics, and it may be useful to sketch, in
conclusion, what a rationalized law of slavery might have looked like.
The primary alteration would have been a transformation in the no-
tion of property. It would no longer be defined as the expression of
individual will, subject to regulation only for the most pressing social
goals. Instead, property, at first only in slaves but eventually in every-
thing, would be defined as the delegation by society as a whole of
certain limited authority to "owners," who would be charged with
exercising that authority only in socially prescribed ways. Once the
master-slave relation was thus generalized, other anomalies would dis-
appear. In particular, once social control was embodied in all rela-
tionships rather than being superimposed on them, there would be no
need to distinguish between some relationships governed by market or
individualistic notions and others governed by other notions; the
strain toward categorization and its cognate problem, the attempt to
define rigid racial rules, would be-eased.1 7
Tushnet's thesis is extraordinarily interesting. As a way of begin-
ning to evaluate it, let me assume the position of a common law irreden-
tist, like Lord Mansfield. Mansfield is thought to have said in Somerset's
Case1 8 that because slavery was contrary to natural law, it could only
exist by positive prescription in any legal system. Has Tushnet done
anything more than show that Mansfield was correct two hundred years
earlier? A common law lawyer's view of all the evidence Tushnet mus-
ters might be something like the following. The common law by 1775
could not adapt to two contrary signals on fundamental matters: slaves
are property, and yet they are humans. According to Blackstone, prop-
erty meant unfettered dominion and control. Yet slaves, supposedly
chattel property, could not be so treated by the law because of their
humanness. Viewed from the perspective of a common law irredentist,
the slave case law confusion in states like North Carolina is easily ex-
plainable. Thus, Tushnet's data on the development of slave law can
plausibly be fitted into both Tushnet's theory and Lord Mansfield's sim-
ple observation.
There are other interesting perspectives on Tushnet's schema. He
assumes that there is a bourgeois law that remains stable and coherent
throughout the period of his research. I do not think the common law
was bourgeois in 1810;19 others seem to agree with me.20 The common
17 Id. at 230-31. Ironically, this sounds like a description of feudal law.
18 Somerset v. Stewart, 20 Howell St. Tr. 1 (K.B. 1772).
19 Duncan Kennedy has argued that Blackstone's Commentaries were bourgeois in their
conception of categories of the law. Kennedy, The Structre of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28
BUFFALO L. REv. 205 (1979).
20 See, e.g., M. Hoawrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw, 1780-1860
(1977).
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law may have been, as Horwitz argues, on its way to becoming bour-
geois, but its bourgeoisness cannot be posited as a fact at the beginning
of the period Tushnet covers.
I also question the placement of tort law in the slave law column of
Tushnet's schema. He appears to have done this because of his interpre-
tation of cases involving Black slaves in which Southern judges refused
to apply the fellow servant rule. Under the fellow servant rule, the neg-
ligence of an injuring employee may not be imputed to his employer in
an action by an injured employee against the employer for the work-
related injury. One modem commentator has argued that the basis for
the fellow servant rule was that such an imputation would discourage
employees from exercising the necessary precautions to protect them-
selves from the negligence of a fellow servant.2 ' This theory assumed
that an employee would know in advance of the negligence of his fellow
servant and would inform his supervisor or quit if necessary. Such a
theory was obviously inapplicable in the case of a slave. In addition, a
slave could not protect himself contractually. Therefore, in an action by
a slave's master who hired out his slave who was then injured, the hirer
could be held liable for the negligence of his own slave. At some level,
the theory of these hired slave cases was that there was a failure of
supervision.
Non-slave fellow servant cases held that the only protection an em-
ployee could secure against the negligence of a fellow employee was a
contractual indemnity clause. A slave master, by contrast, could use the
law of tort to recover in similar circumstances. Thus, Tushnet sets con-
tract against tort in his schema. The problems with this simple contrast
are manifold. Virtually all commentators believe that the law of tort
was as influenced by the entrepreneurial milieu of early nineteenth cen-
tury America as was contract law. In addition, tort law in 1800 was a
nascent set of unconnected theories awaiting time and social develop-
ment before they could become a unified whole. Finally, it is not clear
to this day whether the fellow servant cases are properly viewed as con-
tract cases, tort cases, or a combination of both.22
The problems with Tushnet's schema are less significant than the
criticism to which I alluded earlier. Tushnet's method is obviously
21 See A. MANCHESTER, A MODERN LEGAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND AND WALES 1750-
1950, at 287-93 (1980).
22 Even if the fellow servant cases do not permit simple contrast of contract to tort, the
fellow servant cases involving slaves that Tushnet discusses are very interesting. They reveal
that in the context of a master suing to recover for damage to what he conceived to be his
property, the intellectually absurd underpinnings of the fellow servant rule would not be
extended beyond the employer-employee context. They- also show, perhaps not accidentally,
that slave masters would receive better protection than simple laborers.
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achronological and alocal. Anyone acquainted with scholarship on
American slavery is aware that major economic and geographic changes
occurred in the institution of slavery during the period Tushnet dis-
cusses. New areas of the South were settled. The soil in some of the
older states was exhausted. The-end of the slave trade altered the mar-
ket and sources for such labor. In another new book,23 Paul Finkelman
has argued that the northern courts became increasingly receptive to
claims of freedom, asserted by Black slaves who sojourned, even momen-
tarily, in a northern state.24 Tushnet never mentions these changes.
Surely their impact on slave law should be investigated. Because
Tushnet homogenizes decisions of one decade and state with those of
other times and places, one gets no sense of what these developments in
the institution might have meant to the law of slavery.
Tushnet makes one controlled chronological excursus. He investi-
gates North Carolina case law on criminal matters involving slaves, in-
cluding the famous case of State v. Mann.25 In Mann, the North Carolina
Supreme Court held that a hiring master was not answerable for the
crime of assault and battery prosecuted out by an injured, borrowed
slave. Tushnet's exegesis of North Carolina case law purports to show
how, in the absence of a comprehensive code, the North Carolina courts
unsuccessfully attempted to develop the conceptual (and categorical)
approach of slave law.
To evaluate Tushnet's thesis on North Carolina, consider the case
of State v. Tackett.26 The case involved the state's successful prosecution
of one Tackett, a white apprentice, for killing Daniel, a Black slave.
Daniel was lying in wait for Tackett at Tackett's home as a result of
prior quarrels between them. Tackett came home, got a gun, and killed
Daniel.
At the trial, Tackett's lawyer attempted to introduce evidence that
Daniel was "turbulent," "impudent," and "insolent." His intent was to
show that Daniel's chronic insolence, read "uppitiness," made the killing
manslaughter at worse, and perhaps no more than a justifiable homi-
cide. The trial judge excluded the evidence because it was not related
either to Daniel's general behavior toward Tackett, or to Daniel's be-
havior on the night of the killing.
At the time of the trial and appeal, North Carolina had three stat-
utes that arguably governed the case.27 This fact, although admitted by
23 P. FiNIKLMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION (1981).
24 Id. at 126-80.
25 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263 (1824).
26 8 N.C. (1 Hawks) 210 (1820).
27 Chapter 4 of the North Carolina Laws of 1791 provided:
And whereas by another act of Assembly passed in the year 1774, the killing
of a slave, however wanton, cruel and deliberate, is only punishable in the
first instance by imprisonment and paying the value thereof to the owner,
[Vol. 67:428
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Tushnet, struck me as odd because North Carolina was supposedly a
state without an extensive series of statutes governing slavery. I will
leave it to others to determine whether North Carolina's system of hap-
hazard slave statutes was really very different from the states with slave
codes. The purport of the three statutes is fairly clear. A statute of 1791
repealed a statute of 1774 insofar as it made a premeditated, willful
murder of a slave not common law murder. Thus after 1791, the killer
of a slave could be tried for common law murder. An 1801 statute at-
tempted to prohibit procedural evasions used to defeat the commence-
ment of a prosecution of a slave murderer. An 1817 statute seems to
have been an attempt to decree that the killing of a slave, short of com-
mon law murder, would still constitute a criminal offense, e.g., man-
slaughter. Without the 1817 statute, the statute of 1774 arguably
rendered a non-murder, homicide of a slave not a criminal offense.
On appeal, the Attorney General in State v. Tackett argued that the
statute of 1817, which referred to killings of slaves under "like circum-
stances," was inapplicable to the case because Tackett was a murderer.
Because there was no 'justification" for murder, as opposed to man-
slaughter, the evidence brought up at trial, which was designed to show
how the circumstances were "unlike," was properly excluded.
Tackett's attorney argued on appeal that the law of 1817 did noth-
ing more than make the manslaughter of a slave a criminal offense. The
law did not purport to limit or control the evidence which might be
introduced in a proceeding to determine whether the killing was
justifiable:
But it does not-pretend to define what shall constitute the slaying of a
slave manslaughter: it leaves that to be determined by the Judges,
which distinction of criminality between the murder of a white person and of
one who is equally an human creature, but merely of a different complexion,
is disgraceful to humanity and degrading in the highest degree to the laws
and principles of a free, christian and enlightened country: Be it enacted...
That if any person shall hereafter be guilty of willfully and maliciously killing
a slave, such offender shall upon the first conviction thereof be adjudged
guilty of murder, and shall suffer the same punishment as if he had killed a
free man; any law, usage or custom to the contrary notwithstanding. Provided
always, That this act shall not extend to any person killing a slave outlawed
by virtue of any act of Assembly of this state, or to any slave in the act of
resistance to his lawful owner or master, or to any slave dying under moderate
correction.
repdntedin H NEWBERN, MARTIN & OGDEN, THE PUBLIC ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASsEMBLY
OF NoRTH CAROLINA 8-9 (1804).
Chapter 21 of the Acts of 1801 provided: "That if any person shall hereafter be guilty of
feloniously, wilfully and maliciously killing any slave, such offender, upon conviction thereof,
on being arraigned stands mute, or challenge peremptorily more than thirty-five jurors, shall
suffer death without benefit of clergy."
Chapter 18 of the laws of 1817 provided "[t]hat the offense of Killing a Slave shall here-
after be denominated and considered homicide, and shall partake of the same degree of guilt
when accompanied with the like circumstances that homicide now does at common law." An
Act to punish the offense of killing a slave, Ch. 18, 1817 N.C. Laws 18.
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under the ordinary rules of law: and while the Common Law lays
down general rules, by which we are to ascertain whether the killing
of one man by another, between whom there is no relation, and who
stands on an equality with each other, be murder or manslaughter, or
neither, and lays down different rules to govern cases in which the
deceased stand in particular relations of dependence and inferiority to
the slayer, as an apprentice, servant, pupil, sailor or soldier, to his
master, tutor, or officer. So here, where the wide distinction exists in
the grades of our society between freemen and slaves-whites and
blacks; and where the policy of the Law as well as the inveterate hab-
its of our population, and the best feelings of our nature enjoin it upon
us to keep these classes as distinct in every respect as possible, and, to
that end, to enforce the superiority of the one, and the subordination
due from the other, a new rule must be laid down fitted to this state of
things, and adapted to this particular relation and the exigency of our
situation. A free man, who hath been taught from his infancy to look
for humility and obedience in a slave, and who feels every moment of
his life the vast superiority that he has over him, early learns that
tamely to submit to words of reproach from a slave is degrading to the
last degree, and that a blow, even the slightest, is the greatest dis-
honor. At such an insult, therefore, his passions are inflamed to the
utmost pitch; and if, in such a state, he slay the offender, he has a
right to claim the benefit of that rule which regards mercifully the
fraility and infirmity of human nature. If any precise rule could be
laid down, I would say that a word from a slave was a provocation
equal to a blow from a free man; and the most trifling assault, to a
deadly stroke.' There is, in the very nature of things, an essential dif-
ference between the cases of slaves and free men; and the Court can-
not disregard it, arising as it does, out of our population, laws,
education, and habits.28
It is implicit in this argument that: (1) the evidence, if probative, was
admissible to refute a charge of murder; (2) generalized evidence of
Daniel's "insolence" would give rise to a presumption that he was inso-
lent to Tackett; and (3) the jury should have been permitted to consider
this evidence before convicting Tackett.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina, in an opinion by Chief Jus-
tice Taylor, agreed that the evidence was improperly excluded. The
lower court erred when it directed the jury "that under the act of 1817,
the case was to be determined by the same principles of law as if the
deceased had been a white man." Instead, the Supreme Court held that
the Act merely made the manslaughter of a slave a criminal offense and
left it to the courts to decide what evidence was admissible on the ques-
tion of whether the homicide was justifiable. The court also specifically
held that in the context of a slave society, insolent words might consti-
28 8 N.C. (I Hawks) at 214-15.
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tute a defense for a murder although mere words could not excuse a
murder at common law. Consequently, the court ordered a new trial.
Tushnet believes that the Tackett decision, as part of North Caro-
lina decisional law, illustrates that the analogical method of the com-
mon law could not develop the more stable categorization approach of
the codes. But the more I think about Tackett, the more I am convinced
that it supports a very different interpretation of the North Carolina
cases and the codes. At a simple level, the decision suggests that com-
mon law judges will deal with statutory interventions as a common law
matter. In all probability, the phrase "like circumstances" in the 1817
act meant that all common law defenses against a charge of manslaugh-
ter, including a justificatory argument, were available in an action in-
volving slaves. It did not mean, until Chief Justice Taylor glossed it in
Tackett, that like circumstances included the peculiar circumstance at-
tendant in the social phenomenon of enslavement.
To present my position more generally, why is it that a code, when
left to judicial interpretation as was done in parts of the South, could
deal more stably with the slavery system than the common law-assum-
ing the common law could possibly deal with the system. Tushnet as-
sumes, I believe, that statutes could create categories that the common
law "analogy" method could not develop. Tushnet also posits that, be-
cause slavery was viewed as a form of property ownership subject to
state regulation, the codes established a more compelling model of legal
regulation than did the common law. But what is so stable about the
statutory "categories"? Clients, lawyers, and judges frequently expand,
negate, and otherwise change statutory categories by using arguments
that are analogical. Sophisticated statutory interpretation is at best a
form of common law rulemaking. Tushnet's dichotomization of slave
law/categories/statutory law, and bourgeois law/analogies/common
law, denies this.
If I am correct that Tushnet's dichotomy is wrong, then two conclu-
sions follow. First, his prediction as to where slave law could have
gone29 is supportable only at the level of grand ideology. The southern
states adopted slave codes, not because the common law system was in-
trinsically unable to accept slavery, but because it could not sort out the
different rules that the slaveholders thought desirable with sufficient ra-
pidity to satisfy them. Its slowness to adjust and to afford adequate con-
trol is attributable to the common law method and to the problems of
reconciling what were fundamental and inconsistent notions: that slaves
were property, yet they were also humans. Second, the dichotomy itself
collapses if the legal, institutional basis that Tushnet argues determined
the sorting out of slave law does not exist. That slave law was an aspect
29 See text accompanying note 17 supra.
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of American law shows, more than anything else, how law can be called
upon to serve almost any societal end.
Russell K Osgood*
© All Rights Reserved.
* Associate Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. The author thanks Professors Gary
Simson of Cornell Law School and Aviam Soifer of Boston University School of Law for
reading drafts of this review.
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